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10
Colonising law for the poor: access to justice in the new 
regulatory state
Peter Sanderson and Hilary Sommerlad
Legal aid represents an interesting, if neglected, area of New Labour’s 
policy agenda. Its signifi cance derives not only from the fact that a 
disproportionate number of key fi gures in New Labour shadow and 
governmental posts earned their living from legal aid work in the 1980s 
and 1990s, but also from the fact that the development of policy in this 
area from 1995 onwards exemplifi es the attempt to reconcile a dis-
course of social justice with the techniques of New Public Management 
(NPM) and the parallel discourse of commitment to the citizen as 
public service consumer.
This chapter will explore some of the resulting tensions in New 
Labour rhetoric and policy in this area. We will initially identify the 
ways in which legal aid could be seen to underpin the practical reali-
sation of social justice and citizenship as envisaged by T. H. Marshall, 
before outlining the history of legal aid reform from 1995 onwards, 
culminating in the reforms which followed on from the Carter reviews 
of Legal Aid in 2006. In the course of this review we will explore the 
discursive properties of Ministerial statements and policy documents 
on legal aid, and the way in which the social construction of some legal 
aid clients and their lawyers as parasitical has been used to justify the 
transformation of the scheme. We will then identify ways in which 
the reforms have become increasingly infl uenced by conceptions of 
value for money and the new regulatory state (Braithwaite, 2000). 
The consequent transformation which has been wrought in legal aid is, 
we would argue, inimical to the very ideals of social justice that New 
Labour politicians claimed to be promoting.
The chapter is a critical analysis of legal aid policy and discourse 
based on documentary and secondary sources. In addition, the authors 
have used data gathered in the course of a series of research projects 
on legal aid lawyers over the past decade (Sommerlad, 1999, 2001; 
Sommerlad and Sanderson, 2009, for accounts of methodology), 
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including twelve interviews conducted by the authors specifi cally for 
this chapter with policy makers, national representatives of major 
advice agencies, representatives of legal aid practitioners, and partners 
in prominent legal aid specialist fi rms.
Publicly funded legal advice and representation have depended 
heavily on a supply base of committed solicitors and barristers working 
for substantially less than the large sums featuring in Ministerial state-
ments and the front pages of popular newspapers, as well as the work 
of law centres and other not-for-profi t (NFP) advice agencies. The 
development of the new form of regulation of the sector by means of 
cost control, contract and audit has ‘colonised’ the practice of legal aid 
lawyers in the manner identifi ed by Michael Power (1997) in his analy-
sis of the audit society: affected organisations begin to strive for the 
measurable goals imposed from outside, rather than the less tangible 
value-based goals (of which ‘justice’ is a good example) which were 
previously the focus of their activity. The consequent transformation 
of the values and practices of both individual practitioners and the 
organisations they work for has, we argue, had a deleterious effect on 
law work with the poor and socially excluded.
Legal aid as a cornerstone of citizenship
The lack of access to legal services in the 1920s to settle housing dis-
putes and workers’ accident claims prompted one of the founders of 
the ‘Poor Man’s Lawyer’ movement to describe the rule of law as ‘an 
anaemic attenuated make-believe which we fl ourish in the eyes of the 
poor as “justice”‘.1 Twenty-fi ve years later T. H. Marshall made essen-
tially the same point: ‘the civil element [of citizenship] is composed 
of the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, 
freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to 
conclude valid contracts’ and ‘the right to justice. The last is of a differ-
ent order from the others, because it is the right to defend and assert 
all one’s rights on terms of equality with others and by due process of 
law’ (1950, 10–11).
Not only are all other rights ultimately dependent on the right and 
ability to litigate (Cappelletti and Garth, 1981) on terms of equality 
with others, but the need of the disempowered for this right exceeds 
that of other citizens. In any society, poor people are more likely to 
get into trouble with the law, come into contact with state agencies, 
suffer violence and abuse, experience precarious and sometimes dan-
gerous employment, live in poor-quality housing and be exploited by, 
for instance, private landlords. Further, as the Legal Services Research 
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Centre (LSRC) research into legal need and problem clusters has 
shown, civil justice problems are often both aspects of broader social, 
economic and health problems, and tend to compound such problems 
and cause new ones (Pleasence et al., 2004; 2006) – for instance, poor 
people are more likely to suffer health problems, and an extensive body 
of research links this with civil law problems (e.g. BMA, 1998; Amato, 
2000). These problems are also intimately connected with power imbal-
ances. Two of the key dimensions of social inequality are lower levels of 
education and limited access to the skills and technologies which could 
assist in independent problem resolution, and research also suggests 
that the poor are more likely to feel powerless and not entitled to take 
action (Sandefur, 2007).
Further, access to justice has become more vital for poor people in 
the UK in recent decades as a result of the expansion of civil law rights 
and obligations related to, for example, children (Goriely, 1998), and 
because they have experienced the brunt of the restructuring of the 
economy and the related neo-liberal reconfi guration of the welfare 
state. As is well known, the Conservative administrations presided 
over a dramatic increase in poverty, and, whilst New Labour policies 
initially achieved a reduction in poverty, a report published by the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation in 2009 (see Hills et al., 2009) showed an 
increase in numbers of people in ‘deep poverty’, that is, below 40 per 
cent of the median. At the same time, the privatisation of large parts 
of state provision frequently included lighter regulation and entailed a 
corresponding privatisation of enforcement (Braithwaite, 2000) whilst 
the increased targeting of welfare increased the need for the vulnerable 
citizen to be able to dispute the ways in which discretion is exercised. 
Legal aid offers a means of combating what Colin Crouch has termed 
the ‘degradation and residualisation of public services’ (2001), of 
holding government to account, and challenging the stigmatisation of 
poverty. In addition, it is the last resort of those at the sharp end of the 
politicisation of the criminal justice system, and the elision between 
civil and criminal law, for example in antisocial behaviour legislation.
The case for providing universal access to legal advice and representa-
tion as a necessary corollary to the provision of public welfare goods and 
the objective of social justice is therefore a strong one, as was recognised 
by Tony Blair in 1996: ‘legally enforceable rights and duties underpin a 
democratic society, and access to justice is essential to make these rights 
and duties real’ (Bean, 1996, xiii). However, from the inception of the 
Legal Aid Scheme, the form of access that should be provided has been 
a matter of debate. On the one hand, providing state funding towards 
access to private solicitors’ fi rms and barristers carries risks in terms the 
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development of what economists call ‘moral hazard’ (the danger that 
‘expert professionals’ will use the inability of clients to assess the value 
of their services to extract an excessive rent from their professional 
licence) and politicians call a ‘gravy train’. On the other, the provision of 
cheaper salaried services based on the American ‘public defender’ model 
appears to breach the principle that parties entering an adversarial legal 
system should do so on the basis of ‘equality of arms’. This dilemma 
appears as a recurring theme throughout the history of legal aid.
The origins and expansion of legal aid, 1945–1986
As with other services which developed as bespoke products deliv-
ered by expensive professionals to a small number of private, monied 
clients, opening up legal services to the wider community generated 
diffi cult questions about the role of the professional, and in particular 
about who should administer these services and defi ne their substance, 
quality, access to them and their cost. Marshall had envisaged a sim-
plifi cation of the processes of dispute resolution in the form of cheap, 
non-expert salaried advisers and the education of the ordinary citizen 
in the law, an option which was prefi gured in the establishment of 
Citizens’ Advice Bureau (CAB) legal advice sessions during the Second 
World War. But despite strong representations to the 1944 Rushcliffe 
Committee that the legal aid scheme should be based on such a sala-
ried service and focused on housing, debt and benefi t problems (Hynes 
and Robins, 2009), the committee decided in favour of the Law Society 
proposal for a ‘judicare’ scheme (Goriely, 1996, passim). Judicare was 
administered by the legal profession, and offered equal access to adver-
sarial litigation processes, provided by solicitors in private practice, and 
barristers, who were paid on the basis of hourly rates with little control 
over quality or cost. This decision laid the ground for future public 
expenditure problems. It also skewed the scheme towards the interests 
of private solicitors, few of whom had either an interest or expertise in 
welfare problems: services available were therefore limited primarily 
to family law (and criminal defence). Where new services were estab-
lished specifi cally to meet new legal needs, such as tribunals, no right 
to legal representation was granted.
By the late 1960s various factors coalesced to renew concern with 
access to justice. The community, anti-statist (and anti-professional) 
civil rights politics and new equality discourses of the time clearly 
identifi ed the defi ciencies in the paternalistic Beveridge welfare model 
and, in the case of legal aid, highlighted the failure of the scheme to 
serve impoverished and vulnerable communities. At the same time, 
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the percentage of the population eligible for legal aid had fallen from 
nearly 80 per cent in 1949 to 40 per cent. One result was an increase in 
voluntary-sector involvement in tribunal representation and the provi-
sion of social welfare legal advice. The sector’s strong emphasis on stra-
tegic solutions to poverty also fuelled recourse to public-law solutions. 
This policy work was reinforced by the political use the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s and 1870s made of the courts, and the related 
development of the law centre movement (Robins, 2008).
Together these developments contributed to an expansion of legal 
aid. In 1973 the ‘Green Form Scheme’ was introduced, enabling advis-
ers to give advice or assistance on any matter of English law after the 
application of a simple means test (Hynes and Robins, 2009). In 1979 
the Labour government raised eligibility levels so that 79 per cent of the 
population were entitled to legal aid. This period also saw the spread 
of law centres and the establishment of ‘radical’ solicitors’ practices 
committed to a political use of law such as the judicial review of gov-
ernment and government agency decisions and the extension of legal 
regulation into such ‘private’ spheres as the family.
The reform programme: 1986 to the 2006 Carter Report and 
beyond
It is a commonplace that the expansion of social citizenship was largely 
halted with the election of a Conservative administration in 1979, 
the radical restructuring of the UK economy and the related crisis of 
welfare. The resulting reforms to legal aid, which began in 1986 with 
a cut in eligibility, largely parallel the NPM techniques applied to other 
areas of the public sector: a dual strategy of fi nancial retrenchment and 
managerial control designed to produce cultural change which would, 
in turn, achieve both VFM for the taxpayer and improved quality for 
the consumer (Hood, 1991). These included the transfer of the legal 
aid scheme from the solicitors’ profession to a government quango, 
Legal Aid Board (LAB), enacted by the Legal Aid Act 1988. Cost control 
was achieved through abolition of the link between legal aid fees 
and private fees, and reductions in scope (for instance, property and 
probate ceased to be matters for which a client could obtain legal aid) 
and eligibility. Levels of eligibility were further reduced in 1992/93 so 
that only 53 per cent of households could qualify for legal aid.
Control over professional work, cultural change and the quality of 
service delivery were addressed through the introduction of legal aid 
franchising. This (initially non-compulsory) system of quality assurance 
initiated the micro-regulation of professional work through manage-
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ment audits (by non-lawyers) of criminal and civil legal aid fi les against 
the transaction criteria which had been devised as proxy measures 
of the quality of substantive work (Sherr et al., 1994). The objective 
of making law fi rms more commercial was addressed by the require-
ment that fi rms must make annual business plans. The installation of 
an economic calculus to evaluate the justice system, in which law was 
therefore depicted as a product or service like any other, entailed only 
slight reference to access to justice (Smith, 1996) – instead the problem 
was represented as one of ‘over-consumption of legality’ (Abel, 2003: 
287). In this consumerist discourse legal aid clients therefore fi gured 
as ‘fl awed consumers’ (Bauman, 1997), ‘abusers of the service’ (Clarke, 
2004), ‘state-funded rotweillers’ whose access to public funds placed 
opponents at an unfair advantage’,2 suggesting that the taxpayer was 
the real client. The narrative of the undeserving, frivolous legal aid 
litigant was complemented by a discourse of contempt for and mistrust 
of the legal aid practitioner, justifying the LAB’s control over her. We 
discuss this discourse of contempt in greater detail below.
New Labour and the Access to Justice Act 1999
As in other areas of the public sector, New Labour’s legal aid policy was 
more nuanced (Clarke, 2004), to the point of self-contradiction. On 
the one hand access to justice, a drive to raise quality, a focus on social 
welfare law, partnership with the voluntary sector3 and a pervasive 
emphasis on the need to target social exclusion have been consistent 
themes. In 1999 this shift in emphasis resulted in the Access to Justice 
Act (AJA), which replaced the Legal Aid Board with the Legal Services 
Commission (LSC) as the quango overseeing the administration of legal 
aid funding. It also established the Criminal Defence Service (CDS) and 
the Community Legal Service (CLS). The CLS represented an attempt to 
integrate legal aid fi rms with generalist and specialist legal advice serv-
ices, and general advice services into regional ‘seamless webs’, leading 
in 1999 to the establishment of Community Legal Service Partnerships 
(CLSPs). The policy change is also evident in the formidable body of 
research conducted by the LSRC into the extent of ‘justiciable problems’ 
(Pleasence et al., 2004, 2006) and concern with the role of ‘unmet legal 
need’ in the persistence of social exclusion (DCA/LCF, 2001, 2004).4 
This research provided an underpinning methodology for the LSC’s 
allocation of resources designed to meet key welfare law needs in 
areas such as housing and community care, and to develop innovative 
projects such as the Money Advice Pilot.
However, these developments did not solve the issue of access. The 
dilemma over whether legal aid provides access just to a ‘service’, or to 
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a just outcome to a cause, remains signifi cant, in part because in other 
ways New Labour policy can be viewed as a continuation and develop-
ment of Conservative initiatives. For instance, the AJA removed some 
civil legal aid cases, notably personal injury claims, from the scheme 
and effectively replaced their funding by Conditional Fee Arrangements 
(CFAs),5 and whilst this measure was presented as increasing access 
to justice, insurance premiums excluded the poorest in society.6 In 
addition, the legislation strengthened NPM controls over the suppliers 
of legal aid services and laid the basis for a system of contracts which 
would replace franchising, and would control the unit cost of cases and 
the number of cases suppliers could take on. The continuing drive to 
contain costs also resulted in a tightening up of the merits test which 
all applications for legal aid must pass, and the introduction of a hard 
cap on civil legal aid expenditure. Together these measures replaced an 
entitlement to civil legal aid services by a ‘scheme of prioritising cases 
and resources (rationing) as a way of meeting the needs of the general 
public within a limited budget’ (Moorhead, 2001: 550; Sommerlad, 
1999). As a result, New Labour policy increased the emphasis on 
the ‘responsibilitisation’ of the individual: through the provision of 
advice and information about legal problems (LCD/LCF, 2001) by, 
for instance, the Commmunity Legal Advice Web site (Legal Services 
Commission, 2009) it was hoped that individuals would be able to 
understand and solve their legal problems by themselves.
The verdict on the AJA by one expert commentator on legal aid was 
damning:
The 1949 Act was an opening of the door to justice for citizens. The 1999 
Act has in effect erected a large notice over that door entitled ‘Restricted 
Entry . . . The truth is that the Government’s reforms spring not from a 
desire to improve access to justice but from the Treasury’s need to control 
the budget. The entire new system fl ows from the decision to cap the 
budget. (Zander, 2000)
The conclusion that the imposition of a hard cap would ‘infect the 
whole enterprise’ appears to have been borne out by subsequent devel-
opments. The continuing rise in the cost of criminal legal aid,7 and 
of some civil cases, most notably immigration, produced a crisis in 
the CLS, the abolition of CLSPs and the commissioning of a series of 
reviews of the legal aid scheme.8
The Carter Report
These developments culminated in the decision to commission Lord 
Carter of Coles to review legal aid, and in particular criminal legal aid 
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(Carter, 2006), with the aim, as Lord Falconer argued, of forcing crimi-
nal practitioners ‘to restructure . . . [to] get more control over the costs 
of provision’ (Hynes and Robins, 2009). However, the disproportion-
ate impact which Carter’s proposals would have had on fi rms run by 
black and minority ethnic (BME) practitioners (MDA, 2006) led to its 
 rejection by the then Minister.
Instead it was decided to impose aspects of Carter’s recommenda-
tions on law fi rms and the NFP sector with a contract for civil legal 
aid, despite the fact that no research had been conducted into how 
this would impact on them. The resulting ‘route map’ for civil legal aid 
work produced by the LSC in 2008 (in Focus, LSC, 2008) introduced 
the following measures: fi xed or graduated fees for a substantial part 
of civil work, a unifi ed contract for all work, and Best Value Tendering 
for bulk contracts (limited to £25 or £50,000).9 The impact of the 
Carter reforms on the character of legal aid provision is discussed in 
detail later in this chapter: the burden of our argument is that they 
represented the culmination of a process whereby cost containment 
strategies, combined with micro-management of legal aid transactions, 
impacted negatively on access to quality legal advice.
A further development in legal advice services was the establishment 
of Community Legal Advice Centres (CLACs) and Networks (CLANs), 
which, it was argued, would improve access to justice by providing a 
‘one-stop shop’ responsive to local needs (LSC, 2005).10 The proposals 
have been criticised on the grounds of insuffi cient funding, the level of 
quality of service they will be held to, the diffi culties monopoly suppli-
ers face in dealing with confl icts of interest between clients and their 
lack of independence from local authorities (Griffi th, 2008).
Before discussing the impact of the post-1997 legal aid policy agenda 
we will explore the way in which New Labour politicians have provided 
a discursive justifi cation of their strategy through a specifi c framing of 
the ‘problem’ of legal aid, and the character of legal aid practitioners.
Fat cats on a gravy train: the discourse of contempt
The ambivalence of New Labour policy on the form and delivery of legal 
aid has been matched by the character of the public announcements by 
Ministers responsible for legal aid. New Labour’s public stances on 
legal aid have been characterised by twin binary oppositions. The fi rst 
counterposes ‘fat cat’ lawyers to the taxpayer who funds their alleged 
excesses, while the second counterposes the ‘vulnerable’ who are ‘most 
in need’ of legal aid on the one hand to the undeserving and dangerous 
legal aid applicants, and the vexatious and litigious champions of the 
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‘compensation culture’, on the other. In 2003 the then Home Secretary, 
David Blunkett, was reported on the BBC giving his full backing to Tony 
Blair’s promise to cut public spending on what he called the legal aid 
‘gravy train’:
On Thursday, the day of his speech to the Labour Party conference, Mr 
Blunkett told BBC Radio 4’s Today programme the public would be ‘hor-
rifi ed’ if it knew the way asylum appeals were over-used and ‘the way in 
which lawyers make a lot of money out of it’. (BBC, 2003)
In a competition for resources, asylum seekers struggle to achieve 
public support and credibility, and as a result the wave of reform of 
the asylum system ushered in by the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 
not only included faster removal powers and a reduction in the appeal 
rights of asylum seekers, but also a reduction in the length of time 
that legally aided immigration advisers were permitted to spend on a 
case, from forty hours to fi ve (Burnett, 2008). The Lord Chancellor’s 
response to anxiety about the consequences of this reduction was to 
claim that he was ‘absolutely determined to ensure that the money that 
is spent, is spent on those who actually need the help’ (Burnett, 2008), 
without explaining how the distinction could be made between the 
needy and the rest.
The implicit distinction between the deserving and undeserving 
recipient of legal aid was evident in the justifi cations offered by the 
Labour government for the fi xed-price tendering introduced following 
the Carter review of procurement. Announcing the implementation 
of the fi xed-cost case approach, the Legal Aid Minister, Vera Baird, 
stressed that ‘in order to sustain the best-resourced legal aid system in 
the world we must make sure we get the best value from it. That is the 
only way to ensure that those who need it most, vulnerable people suf-
fering from family and social welfare problems, can be sure it is there 
for them’ (Ministry of Justice, 2007, our emphasis)
The overarching frame for legal aid discourse has been to iden-
tify expenditure on it as ‘a problem’. Thus, in announcing the Carter 
review, Lord Falconer announced that he was ‘determined to tackle 
the problem of legal aid’ (BBC, 2007). The problem was identifi ed 
as both the overall expenditure fi gure and also the fact of it being a 
larger fi gure per head of population than in other countries. However, 
whereas increasing expenditure on health, education and even prisons 
(see Gibb, 2008) was regarded as praiseworthy, expenditure on legal 
aid was presented as excessive and unacceptable. As Lord Chancellor 
in the Brown administration Jack Straw also identifi ed the growth of 
the profession as a problem. In the course of one sentence he managed 
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simultaneously to identify the binary opposition between lawyer and 
taxpayer and to use health and education as a contrasting, meritorious 
object of public spending: ‘There are now three times as many lawyers 
in private practice but paid for by the taxpayer as there were three 
decades ago: the budget has grown faster than the health and educa-
tion services’ (cited in Gibb, 2008). Another aspect of Straw’s verbal 
assault on lawyers concerned the success fees involved in civil litiga-
tion under the CFA arrangements, the very fees which he was respon-
sible for introducing, as a substitute for legally aided civil litigation, 
during his time as Home Secretary. He told the Daily Mail that he had 
instructed ‘the services I control to be much tougher on compensation 
claims, such as for injuries at work’ (cited in Brogan, 2009).
As well as drawing a line between the deserving and undeserving 
applicant for legal aid, New Labour’s rhetorical stance sought to move 
away from outcome-based conceptions of legal advice to a model where 
the key measurement was of procedural quality, and where advice was 
conceived of in units, so that success was measured in terms of volumes 
of advice units offered. In response to a critical article in the Guardian 
in 2008 the Legal Aid Minister, Lord Hunt, cited the fact that ‘the LSC 
funded 800,000 acts of civil and family assistance, up by a third within 
two years’ (Hunt, 2008): this fi gure, however, failed to distinguish a hit 
on an advice Web site from a matter followed through to a successful 
conclusion through representation in a court or tribunal. The sentiment 
of many practitioners is that this transmogrifi cation of legal aid under-
mined its core purpose of providing access to justice, and we explore 
the impact of the reforms further in the following section.
Colonisation and attrition: the effects of change
In his discussion of the impact of auditing practice Power refers to 
the colonisation process, whereby ‘the values and practices which 
make auditing possible penetrate deep into the core of organisational 
 operations . . . in the creation over time of new mentalities, new incen-
tives and perceptions of signifi cance’ (1997: 97). We would argue 
that colonisation has taken two forms. Firstly, the form of contractual 
regulation applied to legal advice provision in the last decade has radi-
cally circumscribed the capacity of legal advisers to make autonomous 
decisions about the amount of time and degree of expertise which 
they apply to particular cases: a process we have reported elsewhere 
(Sommerlad and Sanderson, 2009).The result has been precisely to 
create new  mentalities, incentives and perceptions of signifi cance.
Secondly, the use of procurement policies to transform the supplier 
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base has had complex effects. Committed legal aid specialists concen-
trated in the ‘high street’ medium-size practice have found it diffi cult 
to remain viable, and independent advice agencies, such as Citizens’ 
Advice, have become increasingly dependent on LSC funding for their 
specialist advice provision, in such a way as to signifi cantly transform 
their approach to their avowed mission. This section explores the 
impact of the Carter reforms in the light of these two forms of colonisa-
tion.
The immediate reaction to the LSC’s proposals for change post-Carter 
was that they would exacerbate supplier attrition, encourage ‘cher-
rypicking’ and result in poorer-quality service, especially for the most 
vulnerable (Law Society, 2006). For instance, Burke Niazi Solicitors’ 
response to the LSC consultation on Carter (LSC, 2006a) detailed the 
losses (around 50 per cent in most categories) which fi xed fees would 
entail and argued:
the scheme you propose will prejudice vulnerable and disabled clients, 
especially those with mental diffi culties, most of whom we represent, as 
their cases take longer to prepare . . . [it] will [also] discriminate against 
clients from minority ethnic groups where language barriers often mean 
it takes twice as long to prepare and advise on their cases. (Mental Health 
Lawyers’ Association, 2006)
The link between attrition, cherrypicking and poor quality is implicit in 
these comments; however, for the sake of clarity we will discuss them 
separately.
Attrition
Access to justice depends on a healthy supplier base, but even prior 
to Carter there had been increasing concern about ‘advice deserts’ 
(Sandbach, 2004). Over the years the sector has suffered from low 
morale for a variety of reasons, including the administrative burden 
entailed in legal aid work and the discourse of contempt discussed 
above. Both law fi rms and agencies have therefore found it increas-
ingly diffi cult to recruit (Sommerlad, 2001; Sommerlad and Sanderson, 
2009), and there has been a steady decline in legal aid providers; for 
instance, the numbersof solicitors’ offi ces holding a CLS contract went 
from 4,932 in 2001–02 to 3,632 in 2005–06 (Law Society, 2007). The 
HoCCA expressed grave concern that fi xed fees would exacerbate this 
situation, given the very precarious fi nancial position of many civil legal 
aid suppliers, and the fact that the fees are frequently considerably 
lower than many fi rms’ tailored fi xed fees, which were based on their 
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average cost in handling particular categories of cases. For instance in 
one fi rm the fi xed fee for housing was £174, whereas the tailored fi xed 
fee had been £540.
It appears clear that the predicted contraction in the supplier base is 
taking place: 2006–07 the numbers of solicitors’ offi ces holding a CLS 
contract declined to 3,43711 and the Law Society Legal Aid spokesman 
stated that signifi cant withdrawal from the CLS was taking place in 
rural areas such as the North West, Kent and East Anglia, where:
there is probably only a relatively small amount of legal aid work and 
therefore the costs of maintaining a contract to do it – all the admin-
istration the LSC demands – becomes disproportionate and so other 
 departments put pressure on those doing legal aid work to give it up.
Attrition of the supply base is not, however, limited to rural areas. For 
instance, Lambeth has seen a 50 per cent reduction in the number of 
law fi rms undertaking social welfare law through legal aid from twenty 
fi ve in 2005 to thirteen in 2008, and there is no longer any fi rm offer-
ing legally aided employment law. Nor is attrition limited to solicitor 
providers; law centres and other NFP agencies have closed, or ceased to 
hold CLS contracts.12 As Richard Jenner, Director of the Advice Services 
Alliance (ASA), observed, ‘agencies that are geared towards doing 
straightforward cases will be fi ne. Our concern is that those agencies 
that undertake complex cases and /or cases for clients with language 
diffi culties, disabilities or other special needs are going to struggle’ 
(Hynes and Robins, 2009). It is predicted that the combined effect of 
the unifi ed contract and the introduction of CLACs and CLANs will lead 
to more closures.
A managing partner of a fi rm in a large town in the north of England 
gave the following account of the impact of fi xed fees on family law 
work:
take stand-alone divorces, we used to get £220 and VAT, whereas now it’s 
£197 and VAT; we only do around fi fty a year of these, as it’s unusual for 
people to just want a divorce with no other issues, but for a fi rm like this 
that loss shaves away at profi t margins which are already so slim
and as a result:
for the fi rst time we’ve decided not to bid for the LSC grant-aided training 
contracts because I felt that I couldn’t commit myself to that time because 
the fi nancial situation is so precarious.
Her subsequent explanation for why the fi rm did do stand-alone 
divorces – ‘because, as with all these matters, people’s problems are 
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intertwined’ points to the multiplier effect of attrition in single special-
isms. Similarly, another practitioner spoke of the diffi culties the decline 
in housing lawyers posed for her clients who had suffered domestic vio-
lence, but explained that her fi rm had been obliged to withdraw from 
housing because:
our housing worker left and we couldn’t replace her because you must 
have an experienced person because otherwise you need someone to 
supervise her but then you can’t afford to pay an experienced person 
because of the low level of the fi xed fee. There are now only three fi rms in 
—— [large northern city] doing legally aided housing work.
The managing partner of a legal aid fi rm in London described 
 provision there as
very fragile, like a patchwork quilt – lawyers refer clients to other provid-
ers in the borough and beyond – you tinker with this at your peril . . . but 
they [the LSC] want to spend less on cases in London – yet it’s in London 
that there is massive unmet need – as their own studies have shown.
He continued:
for every civil/ family case we take on we turn away at least seven, 
because despite the fact that we are a large fi rm we do not have the 
 capacity to take on all these cases.
All respondents spoke of the effect of attrition on the clients, who (in 
the words of one practitioner) ‘circulate round and round as many sup-
pliers as they can to see if someone can take them on – we know that 
because we get people who’ve been round to many fi rms before coming 
to us – and in the end they give up’. An informant from an NFP agency 
spoke of the very great diffi culties she now encountered in fi nding a 
solicitor to do injunctions for battered women clients, and correspond-
ingly a family lawyer said that she was sometimes overwhelmed by 
requests for this service. As another spokesperson pointed out, this 
‘shrinking and increasingly concentrated sector assumes that people 
will travel for help yet of course we’re talking of clients who are least 
likely to be able to travel – i.e. have no money, no transport, problems 
of getting child care, etc.’
Cherrypicking
As the above comments indicate, the imposition of ‘average costs 
per case for everybody, taking no account of whether you serve par-
ticularly vulnerable communities’, generates an economic logic which 
effectively dictates ‘cherrypicking’. As a result, the following comment 
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was typical: ‘many fi rms get clients whose fi rst language is not English 
and for whom the particular fi rm is not their fi rst port of call – they’re 
being shunted round London – 70 per cent of social welfare clients are 
BME’. As the witnesses to HoCCA and responses to the LSC consultation 
explained, such clients generally demand more time, and the diffi cul-
ties of successfully justifying the extra work incentivises cherrypicking:
It’s impossible to complete a case under the fi xed fee and diffi cult cases 
therefore entail a great deal of worry as to whether you will get paid for 
the work you do at all, and mean you under time-record for the work you 
do out of fear that if the case becomes an exceptional claim (i.e. 3 times 
the fi xed fee, entitling you to a detailed assessment of the fi le to see if you 
should be paid the full amount for the hours you have done, as under the 
old system) your costs will be down assessed by the LSC on the basis that 
it has taken you too long to do the work. This happened to quite a few 
of my exceptional claims in the Housing department and I had to spend 
hours and hours of non-chargeable time making appeal submissions to 
the LSC’
A managing partner spelled out the links between the fi nancial 
impact on his fi rm of the fee structure and cherrypicking:
we are only expected to submit exceptional claims in about 20 per cent 
of cases [therefore] we are effectively regularly doing large amounts of 
pro bono work on our cases, producing a loss in income to the fi rm of 
£150,000 for doing the same work, seeing the same clients, at the same 
quality level before fi xed fees were introduced.
He went on to say that this sum represented about 3 per cent of the 
fi rm’s total income, the equivalent of half the annual profi t of the fi rm, 
and that this loss was therefore obliging the fi rm to ‘fi lter out more 
cases that are likely to exceed the fi xed fee level but not get into the 
exceptional category.’ As a result, this fi rm used a paralegal who was 
doing her LPC part-time to operate its own triage service, to ‘fi lter the 
work effectively’.
Another solicitor explained that the fee structure meant that her 
fi rm no longer took any homelessness cases, as these always required 
more than the three hours’ work allowed for by the fi xed fee. A trainee 
solicitor described how the immigration department of her (highly 
respected) legal aid fi rm cherrypicked cases:
we have far more referrals than we can take on, so we constantly – daily – 
turn down a lot of cases, but when there is capacity the solicitor will look 
for a ‘legacy case’ – where we are able to avoid the fi xed fee because the 
client initially made a claim before that date. These cases are  particularly 
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challenging and the clients in more need of expert specialist legal advice 
because the history of their asylum cases here needs untangling and 
explaining . . . we get a lot of these referrals. That makes it diffi cult to 
judge how many of the post-1/10/07 cases we turn down directly as a 
result of the fi xed fee. But I know that it’s an incentive for avoiding such 
cases, and as there’s so much unmet legal need, and so many legacy cases, 
it is not too diffi cult to avoid them for now. However, a lot of solicitors do 
fear for the future of the immigration department in this fi rm and immi-
gration solicitors in general, and how we will be able to give diagnostic 
legal help level advice once the legacy cases have run out.
A spokesperson for the ASA expressed concern about the low take-up 
by advice agencies of the provision for the payment of exceptional 
cases, ‘given that the fi xed fee scheme has been running for over a year 
now – that suggests cherrypicking – i.e. that a lot of providers are not 
doing any diffi cult cases’. As he went on to refl ect, however, it could also 
mean that ‘maybe [some] people are getting a poorer service because 
they are having less time spent on their cases . . .’ Other respondents 
also expressed concern that the logic of the reforms dictated that the 
quality of advice would suffer, and some alleged that the focus on cost 
meant that the LSC was no longer concerned about quality, and that 
this was evidenced by the lowering of contracting standards:
there are fi ve levels . . . you had to score 2 (competence plus) to get into 
the Preferred Supplier Pilot Scheme but now . . . all you need for any of 
the LSC contracts. is a 3 (competent) . . . because the LSC doesn’t want to 
pay for 1 and 2. The thing is if you score 1 or 2 then it’s likely that your 
average costs will be higher because there’s a clear link . . . between the 
quality of work and the amount of time spent. (Moorhead, 2001)
The LSC specifi cation of particular combinations of categories of 
work which must be bid for, the minimum limits on the size of contracts 
and the low fees pose an immediate threat to both the supply base and 
the quality of service, since this favours large fi rms and agencies able to 
do high-volume routine work. It correspondingly poses diffi culties for 
many smaller agencies and fi rms, especially those committed to spe-
cialist and /or high-quality work, including a disproportionate number 
of BME fi rms whose main clientele tends to be BME. At the same time 
it was also predicted that the failure, when fi xing the fees, to take 
account of the client base of particular fi rms or agencies would cause 
practitioners who specialised in complex cases to ‘leave, retire and not 
be replaced, and, increasingly, we will have all the parties represented 
by non-specialist solicitors’ (Professor Masson to HoCCA: 4). As a result 
the managing partner of a well respected legal aid practice said, ‘effec-
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tively what we are seeing is the rise of legal aid factories like —— and 
—— [two large fi rms known to employ large numbers of paralegals] 
in the form of both qualifi ed legal executives and unqualifi ed clerks, at 
low rates of pay)’.
Deteriorating service
Thus, just as cherrypicking is ineluctably linked to fi xed fees, so too 
is the quality of service. A fi rm which consistently scored high in peer 
review and is named as one of the pre-eminent law fi rms in the country 
for education had had a tailored fi xed fee for educational cases, includ-
ing special needs tribunal cases, of £1,092, which, the managing 
partner of the fi rm argued, refl ected both their clients’ needs and the 
level of expertise and work they put into such cases; the fi xed fee for 
the work is £302. In his words, when the LSC introduced fi xed fees ‘all 
the quality stuff went out of the window, because they’re now explic-
itly going for the lowest common denominator’. As a result, as mental 
health specialists Burke Niazi Solicitors make clear, it seems likely that 
many of the providers who leave the scheme will be those who deliver 
a high-quality service:
you will be driving out the quality solicitors who put so much time and 
effort into their cases, particularly those who have strived to enhance 
their qualifi cations by getting on to the various panels of the Law Society 
and other professional bodies.
Conclusion
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, equality of access to effec-
tive legal advice and representation is a cornerstone of a Marshallian 
model of social and political citizenship. This is because the law is an 
essential resource for the powerful – for the state in refusing entry to 
asylum seekers,13 in attempting to reduce antisocial behaviour and in 
its expenditure on welfare benefi ts; to landlords and lenders in recover-
ing assets; and to employers in disposing of unwanted employees – and 
there may be few limits to the amount that these powerful actors are 
prepared to spend on maximising the possibility of achieving a result in 
their favour.14 In an adversarial system it is frequently the case that the 
defendants or respondents are both ignorant of the law and lack any 
corresponding resources to defend themselves – in fact they may often 
be ignorant even of their right to do so. Flawed though it has been, and 
tainted by its association with the socio-economic inequality which the 
law implicitly endorses, legal aid nevertheless was a signifi er that poor 
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people’s problems were as important as those of the powerful. A rhetor-
ical commitment to the cause of the socially excluded was a persistent 
theme in New Labour’s policy portfolio from the mid-1990s onwards, 
and this commitment provided the background rationale for many of 
the post-1998 reforms to Legal Aid.
The signifi cance of the legal aid reform programme over the past two 
decades is not simply in the way it has narrowed eligibility,15 stigma-
tised legal aid lawyers and increased the diffi culty of accessing local 
assistance, but also in its introduction of a calculus which has served 
to diminish that importance. By 2010 the Labour government legal aid 
policy was in effect saying that poor people’s problems could be worth 
only two or three hours of a paralegal’s time, and no more.16
The reductio ad absurdum of this paradigm is the public trumpeting 
of hits on legal advice Web sites or initial diagnostic phone advice as 
constituting an increase in access to justice, when it is impossible to 
gauge not merely whether any individual hit or piece of phone advice 
has resulted in a just outcome but also whether the ‘client’ has even 
understood the ‘advice’.17 This approach elides the distinction between 
the provision of a service and the achievement of a just outcome.
This reduction of civil legal aid to ‘largely a sink service for people on 
means-tested benefi ts’ (Hynes and Robins, 2009, our emphasis) corre-
sponds to Crouch’s characterisation of the neo-liberal reforms as involv-
ing the residualisation, distortion and degradation of public-sector 
services. It is ironic that as the dominance of the neo-liberal paradigm 
is challenged by its manifest failure in the economic sphere its legacy 
should be in part the erosion of the last legal resort of the predictable 
victims of that failure.
Notes
 1 Gurney-Champion (1926: 21), cited in Hynes and Robins (2009).
 2 Under-Secretary at the Lord Chancellor’s Department Gary Streeter, who 
consistently deployed stigma as a strategic weapon in the attack on legal 
aid: ‘Streeter confi rms legally aided litigants are rottweilers’, (1996) New 
Law Journal, 1378.
 3 A pilot project with forty-two voluntary advice agencies, begun by Lord 
Irvine, grew to over 400 by 2002–03 (see Sommerlad and Sanderson, 
2009).
 4 Further work by the LSRC, referred to in the Introduction, delineated the 
interrelated and consequently complex character of the ‘clusters’ of legal 
problems faced by poor people.
 5 CFAs had been brought in through the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990; 
see Yarrow and Abrams (1999).
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 6 At the time, the Legal Action Group (LAG) estimated that ‘as much as £100 
million in compensation would be lost by 75,000 people whose cases were 
currently funded by legal aid’ (in Hynes and Robins, 2009).
 7 The period between when Labour came to power and 2005 had seen a 37 
per cent increase in criminal legal aid. Although this was in large part due 
to government policy (Orchard, Legal Action June 2003: 7, cited in Hynes 
and Robins, 2009), the Treasury had set a ceiling of £2 billion on legal aid 
expenditure.
 8 This brief account telescopes a number of important developments which 
contributed to the eventual commissioning of the Carter Review, including 
personnel changes within both the Lord Chancellor’s Department and the 
LSC, independent research which revealed CLSPs to be ineffective, largely 
due to under-resourcing, leading to gaps in provision; vulnerable to gov-
ernment policy changes and cash demands of CDS (Matrix Report, 2004).
 9 This is a very broad-brush outline of what has been an extremely complex 
development involving judicial reviews of LSC proposals, negotiations with 
the various stakeholders in the CLS and the phased introduction of differ-
ent parts of the proposals.
10 CLACs and CLANs connect with the recognition as a result of the LSRC 
work of the interconnected nature of poor people’s problems; the LSC has 
described its objectives in establishing them as ‘tackling disadvantage and 
promoting social inclusion; delivering legal advice services to local commu-
nities according to local needs and priorities; providing quality integrated 
legal advice services ranging from basic information to representation in 
court, which offer value for money and are supported by co-ordinated 
funding’.
11 The LSC has not released the fi gures for 2007–08.
12 The NFP providers holding a CLS contract had risen from 389 in 2001–02 
to 469. However, by 2007 the number had declined to 458.
13 The extension and democratisation of the law – due in large part to legal 
aid – has led to its increasing use to challenge state power (Bondy and 
Sunkin, 2008), often on behalf of unpopular causes. When the cutbacks 
in welfare lead to legally aided challenges against government agencies, 
and when legal aid is used to fund judicial reviews of Ministers’ decisions 
about, for instance, asylum seekers, it seems plausible to argue that the 
legal aid scheme may be a relatively popular target amongst Ministers: 
see, for example, the assertion by Phil Woolas, the Home Offi ce Minister 
responsible for immigration, that a successful appellant to the Immigration 
Appeals Tribunal had ‘no right to be in this country’ and that immigration 
lawyers and charities were ‘playing the system’ (Barkham, 2008).
14 When challenged about whether the expenditure of £8,000 on prosecuting 
a man for gesturing at police offi cers through a car window was an appro-
priate use of public funds, the Crown Prosecution Service responded that 
‘at no point is cost a factor because we don’t put a price on justice’ (Savill, 
2008).
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15 Eligibility has declined from 52 per cent in 1998 to, in 2007, in the words 
of one respondent, ’the 29 per cent who are the poorest in society, who 
operate in a marginalised twilight zone’.
16 This implicit devaluation of the legal aid client and her problems necessar-
ily entails a devaluation of her lawyer. So we have a nexus – cheap lawyers 
for cheap people producing substandard product. This has resulted in the 
delegation of legal aid work to least-cost labour, that is, to the least expe-
rienced practitioners, and this is now explicitly endorsed by LSC; yet the 
combination of social and legal need and the disadvantage of clients can 
often accentuate the complexity of poor people’s problems.
17 One practitioner described this ‘service’ in the following way: ‘It’s an up-
front diagnostic service rolled out by a few large organisations, some of 
which are not law fi rms . . . so what you get effectively is poor-quality initial 
advice which is not solicitor-led. For instance, —— have been advertising 
for case workers at £16,000 per annum, “no legal experience required” . . .’
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Statutes
Access to Justice Act 1999
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990
Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949
Legal Aid Act 1988
Glossary of terms
AJA Access to Justice Act 1999, the fi rst major reforming Act of the 1997 
administration in the fi eld of legal aid. It established the Legal Services 
Commission as the body which administers legal aid, and the Community 
Legal Service and Criminal Defence Service.
ASA Advice Services Alliance, a national umbrella body for independent 
advice providers.
BME black and minority ethnic.
CAB Citizens’ Advice Bureau.
CLAC Community Legal Advice Centre.
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CLAN Community Legal Advice Network.
CLS Community Legal Service.
CLSP Community Legal Service Partnership.
CFA contingency fee arrangement, or ‘no win, no fee’ agreement, introduced 
to relieve the pressure on public funding of civil legal aid.
CDS Criminal Defence Service.
DCA Department for Constitutional Affairs, the government department which 
succeeded the Lord Chancellor’s Department, and was in turn succeeded by 
the Ministry of Justice.
HoCCA 
LCF Law Centres Federation.
LAB Legal Aid Board.
LSC Legal Services Commission.
LSRC Legal Services Research Centre.
NFP not-for-profi t sector, legal advice providers from outside the private solici-
tor fi rm sector, including advice charities, Citizens’ Advice and law centres.
NPM New Public Management.
VFM value for money.
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